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The Right to Strike in Nigeria and ILO Principles on the Right to Strike


The Right to Strike in Nigeria and ILO Principles on the Right to Strike

By

Femi Aborisade

Department of Business Administration & Management Studies

The Polytechnic, Ibadan

&

Centre for Labour Studies (CLS)


 

Introduction

The right to strike is perhaps next in importance to the right to life. The right to strike influences the balance of relations, not only between employers and employees and their organizations in the various sectors of the economy but also the capacity of the civil society, which includes trade unions, in acting as a counter power to likely excesses that the state may display in the governance process. Thus, the right to strike determines not just the prospects for enjoying improvements in working and living conditions of employees but it is also a precondition for the sustenance of society on a just and democratic basis and enjoyment of other fundamental socio-economic and political rights. Despite the strategic nexus between the right to strike and the attainment of a just society, the right to strike tends to be restricted in labour laws and practically suppressed in the course of actual strike actions in Nigeria. This paper examines not only the exercise of the right to strike in Nigeria within the ambits of the principles established by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) but it also undertakes a critical appraisal of the ILO principles in the light of the operating neoliberal policy framework in Nigeria. The rest of this paper is structured as follows:

  • Theoretical Framework
  • Legal Framework on the Right to Strike in Nigeria
  • Some Indices of Practical Constraints on the Right to Strike in Nigeria
  • The ILO Principles on the Right to Strike
  • Shortcomings in the ILO Principles on the Right to Strike
  • Conclusion

 

 

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

 

Source of Disputes and Strikes

The theoretical framework addresses three interrelated concerns – the source of disputes and strikes, conceptual distinction between disputes and strikes and types/forms of disputes and strikes.

There are various theoretical constructs seeking to explain the source of industrial conflicts and strikes. However, this paper relies on the Marxian viewpoint. Marxists maintain that the capitalist mode of production, the generation of surplus value and the increasing rate of exploitation inherently breed conflicts and strikes and divide modern society into two broad classes. As Marx and Engels (1967:41) put it in the Communist Manifesto ‘society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other – bourgeoisie and the proletariat’. Marx and Engels (1967: 96) explain further the basis for the division of society into two hostile camps:

The essential condition for the existence and sway of the bourgeois class is the formation and augmentation of capital; the condition for capital is wage labour. Wage labour rests exclusively on competition between the labourers. The advance of industry, whose involuntary promoter is the bourgeoisie, replaces the isolation of the labourers, due to competition, by their revolutionary combination, due to association. The development of modern industry, therefore, cuts from under its feet the very foundation on which the bourgeoisie produces and appropriates products. What the bourgeoisie therefore produces, above all, are its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable

Though in a derisive manner, Adam Smith (1948) had earlier explained the inevitability of the process of ‘workmen’ organizing against ‘masters’:

Masters are always and everywhere in a sort of tacit, but constant and uniform, combination, not to raise the wages of labour above their actual rate… Such combinations, however, are frequently resisted by a contrary defensive combination of the workmen who sometimes, too, without any provocation of this kind, combine of their own accord to raise the price of their labour. Their usual pretences are sometimes the high price of provisions, sometimes the great profit which their masters make by their work. But whether their combinations be offensive or defensive, they are always abundantly heard of

 

Disputes and Strikes Distinguished

Davar (1976:305) defines ‘industrial dispute’ as a real and substantial difference, between employees and employers, which has some element of persistency and continuity until it is resolved, and if not resolved is likely to endanger industrial peace of the undertaking or the community. The ILO Committee of Experts maintains that any work stoppage, however brief and limited, may generally be considered as a strike. (ILO, 1994a, paras. 173 and 174). In other words, strike declaration is one of the ways by which grievances or disputes are expressed.

 

Disputes are of two major types – disputes of interest and disputes of rights (Obisi, 1996:70). Conflicts or disputes of interest refer to situations when workers and management fail to reach an agreement in any collective bargaining process on either working conditions or renewal of previous agreements. On the other hand, conflicts or disputes of rights capture grievances or disputes that may arise as a result of differences in the interpretation of an existing agreement.

 

Strikes too have been categorized into various classes by various authors. Tata contends that strikes can be divided into the following four broad classes: political strikes, union rivalry strikes, sympathy strikes and economic strikes (cited in Davar, 1976: 299).  The ILO Committee of Experts classifies strikes based on the nature of demands or objectives of strikers and therefore presents the following categorization of strikes - occupational strikes (seeking to guarantee or improve workers’ working or living conditions), trade union (seeking to guarantee or develop the rights of trade union organizations and their leaders), sympathy strikes (where workers come out in support of another strike, [ILO (Committee of Experts), 1983, para. 217], general and political strikes (cited in Gernigon, Odero, and Guido, 2000). While the broad types of strikes appear limited, the forms in which strikes might take are not only numerous, they are indeed ubiquitous. They could include high labour turn over, sick leave strike, go-slow or restriction of output, high accident rates, sabotage, high rate of absenteeism, mass meetings, rallies, mass protests, picketing, and lock-out of workers by the employers. Indeed, as Verma (1987:412) explains,

 

the relationship between labour and management may lie at any point on the continuum of cooperation to conflict. Thus, both these extreme points on the continuum exist in an organization, an industry, or a society. But at any given point in time, there may be a predominance of one element over the other.

 

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IN NIGERIA

The major relevant Nigerian legislations covering the right to strike in Nigeria include: the Trade Unions Act and the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act 2005; the Trade Disputes (Essential Services) Act, CAP 433, the Trade Disputes Act No. 7 of 1976, Cap. 432, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN), 1990; the Teaching, ETC (Essential Services) Decree (now Act) No 30 of 4th May 1993, which amended CAP 433 and the Teaching, ETC (Essential Services) (Amendment) Decree (now Act) No 44 of 1993 LFN, 1990.

 

Section 30 sub-section (6) of the Trade Unions Act, as amended, outlaws strikes and lock-outs unless they occur in the following four major situations – strikes in non-essential services sectors, strikes over dispute of right, strikes occurring after having exhausted the provisions of the Trade Disputes Act, and provided that a simple majority of all registered members voted to go on strike. The Act  defines  ‘disputes of right’ to mean any labour dispute arising from the negotiation, application, interpretation or implementation of a contract of employment or collective agreement or any other enactment or law governing matters relating to terms and conditions of employment.

 

Section 30(6) of the Trade Unions Act states:

“(6) No person, trade union or employer shall take part in a strike or lock out or engage in any conduct in contemplation or furtherance of a strike or lock out unless:

(a) the person, trade union or employer is not engaged in the provision of essential services;

(b) the strike or lock out concerns a labour dispute that constitutes a dispute of right;

(c) the strike or lock out concerns a dispute arising from a collective and fundamental breach of contract of employment or collective agreement on the part of the employee, trade union or employer;

(d) the provisions for arbitration in the Trade Disputes Act Cap. 432, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990 have first been complied with; and

(e) in the case of an employee or a trade union, a ballot has been conducted in accordance with the rules and constitution of the trade union at which a simple majority of all registered members voted to go on strike.

 

The following deduction, which impinges on the right to strike, could be made from the provision of Section 30(6)(a) of the Trade Unions Act, quoted above - strike is outlawed in the essential services even where right dispute or fundamental breach of contract of employment or collective agreement is involved, whether or not a majority of the workers voted to embark on strike and regardless of the fact that the trade union might have complied with the provisions of the Trade Disputes Act.

 

It is also important to note that the categorization of enterprises as ‘essential service’ almost embraces virtually all sectors of the economy. The Trade Disputes (Essential Services) Act in Section 9 (Interpretation) lists the following establishments as essential services:

 

  • The public service of the Federation or of a State which shall for the purposes of this Decree include service, in a civil capacity, of persons employed in the armed forces of the Federation or any part thereof, and also, of persons employed in an industry or undertaking (corporate or incorporate) which deals or is connected with the manufacture or production of materials for use in the armed forces of the Federation or any part thereof;
  • Any service established or maintained by the Government of the Federation or of a State, by a local government council, a town council or any municipal or statutory authority, or by private enterprise -

(i) for, or in connection with, the supply of electricity, power or water, or of fuel of any kind;

(ii) for, or in connection with, sound broadcasting or postal, telegraphic, cable, wireless or    telephonic communications;

(iii)             For maintaining ports, harbours, docks or aerodromes, or for, or in connection with, transportation of persons, goods or livestock by road, rail, sea, river or air;

(iv)             For, or in connection with, the burial of the dead, hospitals, the treatment of the sick, the prevention of disease, or any of the following public health matters, namely, sanitation, road-cleaning and the disposal of night-soil and rubbish;

(v)               for dealing with outbreak of fire;

(vi)             for, or in connection with, teaching or provision of educational services at primary, secondary or tertiary institutions;

  • Service in any capacity in any of the following organisations –

      the Central Bank of Nigeria,

the Nigeria Security Printing & Minting Company Limited;

any body corporate licensed to carry on banking business under the Banking Decree Act.

 

The provision concerning item (vi) above was included by the Teaching, ETC (Essential Services) Decree (now Act) No 30 of 4th May 1993, which amended CAP 433, LFN, 1990. The said Teaching (Essential Services) Act decreed teaching service to be an essential service where no staff, teaching or non-teaching, can embark on any form of strike [S.2(1)] and where a strike occurs and goes on for more than one week, the striking staff shall be deemed to have resigned their appointment. [S.2 (2) of the Teaching, ETC (Essential Services) Act].

 

The Teaching, ETC (Essential Services) Decree (now Act) No 30 of 4th May 1993 was further amended by the Teaching, ETC (Essential Services) (Amendment) Decree (now Act) No 44 of 1993 by inserting new subsections (3), (4) and (5) in Section 2, with the following implications:

 

A member of staff in the teaching service who embarks on strike for over one week shall be liable to vacate official accommodation that may have been provided, if any [2(3)]. Without prejudice to the provisions of the Trade Disputes (Essential Services) Act, CAP 433, any official or member of an institution who embarks on strike is guilty of an offence and upon conviction is liable to a maximum of two years imprisonment [Section 2(4)]. An offence committed under [2(4)] is triable in the Federal High Court.

 

The Teaching, ETC (Essential Services) (Amendment) Act No 44 of 1993 also substituted a new Section 3 for the Teaching, ETC (Essential Services) Act No 30 of 4th May 1993 to the effect that notwithstanding any thing to the contrary in the Constitution, as amended, the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act or any other enactment, no proceeding shall lie or be instituted in any court for or on account of any act, matter or thing done or purported to be done in respect of the Act[Section 3(1)]. Accordingly, if any proceeding has been instituted on or before or is instituted after the commencement of the Act, such proceeding shall abate, be discharged and made void [3(2)].

 

Though section 30 (6) (d) of the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act 2005 appears to tolerate strike action in non-essential sectors if majority of the workers support the strike action, in reality, there is a counter provision in the Trade Disputes Act, which does not permit strike before exhausting the procedure and no strike is allowed after an award has been made, whether the award is acceptable to the workers or not. The Trade Disputes Act No. 7 of 1976, CAP 432, LFN, 1990 prohibits strikes and lockouts before the National Industrial Court (NIC) makes its award (S.17). Yet, the award of the NIC shall be final and shall be binding on the employers and workers to whom it applies (S.13). Indeed, the award of the N.I.C is unchallengeable; no appeal against NIC award can be taken to any other court [S. 20(3)] and no strike can be declared to challenge it. The statutory procedure for settlement of trade disputes therefore aims at effectively banning strikes, contrary to the provisions of Part III, Paragraph 7  of I.L.O. Convention No 151 of 1957, which provides that ‘No provision of this Convention may be interpreted as limiting in any way whatsoever, the right to strike ‘.

 

The Act criminalizes strike action by prescribing that any person, trade union or employer who contravenes any of the provisions of the Act, which prohibits strike action commits an offence and is liable on conviction to a fine of N10,000 or six months imprisonment or to both the fine and imprisonment.

 

Section 7 of the Trade Unions Act prescribes that the provisions for arbitration in the Trade Disputes Act Cap. 432, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990 shall apply in all disputes affecting the provision of essential services and the determination of the National Industrial Court in all such disputes shall be final. The Trade Disputes (Essential Services) Act, CAP 433 LFN, 1990 makes the following provisions:
 
Section 1 of the Trade Disputes (Essential Services) Act, CAP 433 LFN, 1990 empowers the President to proscribe trade unions or associations in essential services that may embark on strike.
 
Section 3 of the Trade Disputes (Essential Services) Act, CAP 433, LFN, 1990 also provides that no other trade union consisting of the same members as those of the proscribed union or having the same or substantially the same objectives as those of the proscribed union shall be registered until a period of not less than six months has lapsed since the proscription date. Section 4 bans any official of a proscribed organisation from being an official of any trade union or association, any of the members of which are employed in any essential services. The penalty for contravention, upon conviction, is imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years [Section 4(2)].
 
If the Inspector General of Police or the Chief of General Staff is satisfied that an official of a proscribed union has continued to act in ways to obstruct the smooth running of any essential services, an order shall be issued for the detention of such a person [Section 5 of the Trade Disputes (Essential Services) Act, CAP 433, LFN, 1990].
 
Section 8(1) of the Trade Disputes (Essential Services) Act, CAP 433, LFN, 1990 ousts the jurisdiction of the court by providing that no suit or other legal proceedings shall lie against any person for anything done in pursuance of the Act. Section 8(2)(a) suspends the Constitution and whether any provision of the Constitution shall be contravened in pursuance of the Act is not to be inquired into in any court of law. Section 8(2)(b) provides that a detained person cannot enjoy the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, by which a legal process may be set in motion for the court to order the physical production, in court, of a detainee who is alleged of being wrongfully detained.
 
The above provisions of the Trade Disputes, Essential Services Act are no doubt absolutist, authoritarian and draconian. They are unquestionably incompatible with the tenets of a democratic society. The Right to personal liberty, save in execution of a court order, is guaranteed under section 35 of the nation’s Constitution. Right of fair hearing is guaranteed in Section 36 of the Constitution. Access to court in the determination of rights is guaranteed under Sections 6 and 17(2) of the 1999 Constitution. Similarly, Articles 9 and 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provide against arbitrary arrest and detention and guarantee fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of rights and obligations arising from any criminal charge, respectively. In the same vein, Article 6 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights provides guarantees against arbitrary arrest and detention while Article 7 protects the right of fair hearing, presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved by a competent court or tribunal and the right of defense, including defense by a counsel freely chosen by an accused person.
 
The Right to Picketing Curtailed
The amendment of Section 42 of the Principal Act by the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act 2005 seeks to curtail the right of picketing. The Trade Unions Act now provides as follows:
 
“(1)(A) No person shall subject any other person to any kind of constraint or restriction of his personal freedom in the course of persuasion;
(1)(B) No trade union or registered Federation of Trade Unions or any member thereof shall in the course of any strike action compel any person who is not a member of its union to join any strike or in any manner whatsoever, prevent aircrafts from flying or obstruct public highways, institutions or premises of any kind for the purposes of giving effect to the strike.”
 
The above provisions in section 42(1)(A) and (B) breach the right of picketing guaranteed under the previous Sections 42 and 43, which was even safeguarded under military dictatorship. The protection of the right to picket in the Act before the 2005 amendment simply meant a safeguard of the democratic principle of the minority in an organisation having a right to a say while the majority have their way. In other words, it is a democratic practice for the minority to abide by the decision supported by the majority; otherwise appropriate social sanctions are usually adopted as penalties on those who go against organizational decision, if they still intend to retain membership of the organisation. Therefore, it is a democratic practice for unions to enforce the decision for a strike action for example, against strikebreakers. The provision is therefore undemocratic.
 
Section 43 of the Trade Unions Act (before the 2005 amendment) provided that the following acts done in furtherance of a trade dispute shall not be actionable in tort – the listed acts are acts meant to induce other persons to break a contract of employment or which interfere in the trade, business or employment of some other person or the right to dispose of his capital or labour as he wishes; or that threaten the breaking of a contract of employment (whether one in which he is a party or not); or that consist in threatening to induce some other person to break a contract of employment to which that other person is a party.
 
The amendments seek to take away the right of picketing specifically provided in the previous Section 42(1) of the Trade Unions Act, which provides that it shall be lawful for one or more persons, acting on their own behalf or on behalf of a trade union to carry out peaceful picketing meant to peacefully obtaining or communicating information or peacefully persuading any person to work or not to work. Section 42 subsection (2) provides that nothing done in section 42 subsection(1) above shall constitute an offence under any law in force in Nigeria, and in particular, shall not constitute an offence under section 366 of the Criminal Code or any corresponding enactment in force in any part of Nigeria.
 
Some Indices of Practical Constraints on the Right to Strike in Nigeria
Some of the practical constraints on the right to strike in Nigeria highlighted in this paper revolve round three indices, namely, the role of the judiciary, opposition to unionization and the role of security forces.
 
The Use of the Judiciary to Undermine Strikes, in Defense of Profit
Though there are exceptions, the Nigerian judiciary has predominantly turned itself into a ready tool of the executive arm of government to scuttle the expression of the right of the working class to strike. A new trend has emerged in which governments, Federal and State, either run to the industrial courts or the High Courts, rather than the Industrial courts, praying the court to declare particular workers’ strikes and planned strikes illegal. The Nigerian state, through one of its private counsel, declared the June 2007 nationwide strike illegal on the basis of the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Adams Oshiomhole and Nigeria Labour Congress V. Federal Government of Nigeria and Attorney-General of the Federation (2007) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1035) at page 58, where the court declared strike action illegal. The major issue in the case was the imposition of a ^1.50 fuel tax with effect from 1st January 2004 by the Obasanjo regime. Labour and other civil society organizations declared a strike against it. The court held that the Nigeria Labour Congress had no right to call out workers on strike against general economic and political decisions of the Federal Government because such have nothing to do with breach of individual contracts of employment with various employers as envisaged in the Trade Disputes Act.
The above decision of the court runs counter to the principle established by the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, which stated that that the occupational and economic interests which workers defend through the exercise of the right to strike do not only concern better working conditions or collective claims of an occupational nature, but also the seeking of solutions to economic and social policy questions (ILO, 1996a, para. 481). In the same spirit, the Committee has stated that workers and their organizations should be able to express their dissatisfaction regarding economic and social matters affecting workers’ interests in circumstances that extend beyond the industrial disputes that are likely to be resolved through the signing of a collective agreement (ILO, 1996a, para. 484). Thus, in its examination of a particular case, the Committee concluded that ‘[a] general protest strike demanding that an end be put to the hundreds of murders of trade union leaders and unionists during the past few years is a legitimate trade union activity and its prohibition therefore constitutes a serious violation of freedom of association’ (ILO, 1996a, para. 495).
 
 
Also, the Oyo State Government attempted to undermine the strike embarked upon by public sector workers in the state on Monday, 22 April 2002. The workers were protesting non-implementation of N6,500 minimum wage that had been agreed since 2000. Rather than instituting legal action at the Industrial courts, which have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain industrial disputes, the government went to the High Court, where they felt their relief could be granted more speedily. The Oyo state workers refused to abide by the court order, which they considered as undemocratic and anti-union. Similar court order was made when electricity sector workers planned a strike to resist privatization. The court declared the strike illegal. An indefinite strike action called by the NLC to protest the January 1, 2002 hike in the prices of petroleum products suffered the same fate. The strike, which started on Wednesday, 16 January 2002, was called off on Thursday, 17 January 2002 by the Central Working Committee in compliance with a Federal High Court order. At the time of the call off, scores of labour leaders, including the then NLC President, were still languishing in detention in several states of the Federation.   
 
Similar court order was obtained by the Federal Government in a futile attempt to stop the June-July NLC organized nation-wide strike against increases in the prices of petroleum products. Justice Ade Alabi of the Ikeja High Court of Lagos State was not bothered that he lacked jurisdiction to entertain the matter. ‘Labour’ and ‘petroleum’, being items 34 and 39 respectively on the exclusive legislative list of the 1999 Constitution, only a Federal High Court could have been more relevant. Without addressing his mind to section 14(2)(b) of the 1999 Constitution, which provides that the primary purpose of government shall be the welfare and security of the people, Justice Alabi on Friday, 27 June 2003, made an ex-parte order restraining the NLC from calling out workers on strike. ‘Justice’ Alabi did not also consider that the unilateral increases in the prices of petroleum products constituted gross violation of item 62(e) in part I of the Second Schedule to the Constitution, which vests on the National Assembly the power to make laws relating to the control of the prices of essential goods or commodities. Petroleum, being item 39 on the Exclusive Legislative List in the 1999 Constitution, the prices of petroleum products could not be legally varied without a bill passed into law by the National legislators, in accordance with section 4(1) and (2) of the Constitution, which vests legislative powers on the National Assembly.
 
Earlier, on May 28, 2003, the Federal Government had referred the 5-month old strike of the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) to the industrial court. Without concern for the legitimate demands of the strike, the Industrial Arbitration Panel ordered that ‘ASSU should call off its ongoing nationwide strike embarked upon by its members’.
 
What can be deduced from the foregoing is that we are at a qualitatively new stage, where all talks about the rule of law, democracy, fundamental rights, etc, are in the main, only obeyed in their breach. This is the rule in a system ruled by profit consideration. Rather than being independent and acting as a check on the excesses of the executive, the judiciary is in total unity with the other organs of government to deny the working class the enjoyment of basic democratic rights. The ultimate class goal, under globalization, is to chain labour so that employers may make profit, unrestrained. All the sub-systems in the social structure play a functional role of maintaining the lopsided status quo.
 
Under Globalisation: Rule of Law is Rule of Capital, in Defense of Profit
In the age of globalization, the myth surrounding rule of law is formally removed and rule of law is openly and formally declared as rule of capital. As Mkandawire (2007:9) points out, monotasking has sought to reduce the functions of the judiciary to the task of protecting private property. According to a World Bank lawyer, judicial reform is part of a larger effort to make the legal systems in developing countries and transition economies more market friendly. (Messick, 1999:118, cited in Mkandawire, 2007:9).
 
One of the ways by which the policy of privatization is imposed on society by force is the control of the judiciary to dispense ‘justice’ from the standpoint of capital.  To ensure that the Nigerian judiciary plays a role supportive of successfully imposing privatization policy, the World Bank and the Nigerian privatization agency had to organize a training programme for the judiciary. One of the stated goals of the training programme was ‘to put the courts in a better position to handle cases connected to the privatization programme and to handle such matters in a speedy and efficient manner’ (BPE, Annual Report, June 2000 – June 2001:42). In a paper, the then Chief Justice of Nigeria, Justice Uwais, declared:
One crucial and important role of the Judiciary in the privatization programme is to ensure that the programme has credibility…the most significant role of the Judiciary in the privatization programme is in the readiness and preparedness of the Judiciary to provide effective protection of law to investors, speedily and efficiently. Any suspicion that the judicial system will be incapable or unwilling to give such protection is fatal to any privatization programme, particularly where the enterprise concerned demands huge injections of investments (Uwais, 2000:14)
 
There is no pretension, under globalization, that the judiciary is a class judiciary, to protect primitive accumulation by dispossession. This, in spite of the fact that the Constitution, which the judiciary should interpret and defend unequivocally provides against privatization:
The State shall direct its policy towards ensuring –
 
(a) that the economic system is not operated in such manner as to permit the concentration of wealth or means of production and exchange in the hands of individuals or of a group
(1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Section 16(2)(c )
 
The conscious manipulation and control of the judiciary to ensure it serves the interest of capital is responsible for the role the judiciary plays in undermining strike actions, as discussed above.
 
Opposition to Unionization
There tends to be a relationship between the capacity to engage in strike actions and the existence or lack of a union. Strike actions are most effective in the context of a unionized workforce. When workers are un-unionized or de-unionized, they become marginalized individuals. In the interest of keeping down wage bills and maximizing profit therefore, there is a mounting hostility to unionization, in the current age of globalization. The rule in the privatized enterprises tends to be ban on trade union membership and activity. In new tertiary institutions of learning being set up, unions as well as strikes are purportedly outlawed. For example, Governor Olagunsoye Oyinlola of Osun State, in his inaugural speech at the take off of the Osun State University in September 2007,  outlawed strikes and by extension, unions. (Saturday Sun, 22 September 2007:11). Similarly, in Oyo State, 34,000 public sector workers, comprising teachers at primary and secondary schools, local government council employees, health personnel, and so on, were purportedly declared sacked on Wednesday 19 September 2007 for embarking on a prolonged strike for increased pay, N9,400 minimum wage where the exchange rate to the US dollar was about $1:^130. (New Age, Friday, 21 September 2007).
 
 
 
The Role of Security Agencies: Monstrous Violence against the Working Class as a Ruling Class Solution to falling Profitability
One hallmark of capitalism in the phase of globalization is the strengthening of the apparatus of coercion. With all the frenzied call for privatization, there has been no call for privatization of the state and particularly the security arms. As John Rees (2001:6) puts it,
Internationally, the state remains indispensable in underpinning the activiities of multinationals. There are no proposals, even from the most hysterical free marketers, to return to the infancy of the capitalist system, when ….corporations like the East India Company would employ their own troops. Armed action or the threat of armed action by the state remains the last resort for every capitalist corporation whose markets or production facilities are endangered by international rivals, be they states, other corporations or restive foreign populations unconvinced of the virtues of the free market’
 
Thus, the US government, representing the interests of the US corporations, declares that force will be adopted to enforce the market system world-wide:
The lessons of history are clear: market economies, not command-and-control economies with heavy hand of government are the best ways to promote prosperity and reduce poverty. Policies that further strengthen market incentives and market institutions are relevant for all economies (US National Security Strategy, 2002)
 
But in case of resistance or reluctance to adopt pro-business policies anywhere in the world, then force will be used:
While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone. It is time to re-affirm the essential role of American military strength. We must build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge (US National Security Strategy, 2002)
 
The monstrous military face of globalisation declared by the US government is also being demonstrated in Nigeria. Hence, the then Lagos State Commissioner of police, Young Arabamen, told the panel of the Nigerian Senate Committee on Petroleum Resources investigating the killings of protesters by the police during a nationwide strike against increases in the prices of petroleum products that ‘… we have legal right to kill…’. He went further:
 
We were very prudent and humane about the management of the crisis because if we relied on the law, we would be justified to have done otherwise; but for the uniqueness of that strike. We have legal right to kill and we chose not to exercise our right’
(Nigerian Tribune, 24 July 2003:3).
 
It should be recalled that not less than 28 persons were killed during the said strike. The casualty would have been more if the police were to have exercised their right!
 
The point therefore is that the traditional role of the state to repress the poor strata of the society who do not own property in protecting the barefaced profit interest is strengthened unabashedly under globalization.  For, it is admitted that the ‘legal right’ of security agents to kill is not a creation of ‘globalisation’; that tendency is only strengthened. The 1999 Constitution of Nigeria provides exceptional circumstances when the fundamental right to life may be violated. One of the exceptional circumstances is in the course of suppression of riot:
 
‘A person shall not be regarded as having been deprived of his life in contravention of this section if he dies as a result of the use, to such extent and in such circumstances as are permitted by law, of such force as is reasonably necessary –
(c ) ‘for the purpose of suppressing a riot’
(Section 33 (2) (c)
From the foregoing, in the context of globalization culture, the right to strike has come under greater restraint in various ways in Nigeria by the executive, judicial and the security arms of government, as well as employers of labour, in both the public and private sectors, who tend to frown at unionization at enterprise levels.
 
The ILO Principles On the Right to Strike
While the Nigerian labour law restricts the right to strike and the judiciary goes ahead to declare strike action against general economic and political policies illegal, Nigeria is a member of the International Labour Organization, which in principle, recognizes the right to strike as a fundamental right. For example, the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention No. 105 of 1957 prohibits the use of forced or compulsory labour ‘as a punishment for having participated in strikes’ (Article 1 sub paragraph (d)]. Also, the Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration Recommendation No. 92 of 1951 in its paragraph 7 states that no provision of the Recommendation ‘may be interpreted as limiting, in any way whatsoever, the right to strike’. As a member of the international community, it is incumbent on any country that seeks to acquire the status of a civilized state to give effect to resolutions emanating from the ILO, which is an international organization.
 
SHORTCOMINGS IN THE ILO PRINCIPLES ON THE RIGHT TO STRIKE
However, while we have rationalized the right to strike by relying on certain provisions of the ILO cited above, it should be recognized that there is a major shortcoming in the so-called ILO principles on the right to strike. The key shortcoming is that the right to strike is not set out explicitly in any ILO Conventions and recommendations (Gernigon, Odero, and Guido, 2000). What this means is that reliance on the so-called ILO principles, by trade unions, is of limited use. All that we can ascertain as the ‘ILO principles on the right to strike’ are from the opinions of some ILO supervisory bodies (principally the Committee on Freedom of Association — since 1952 — and the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations since 1959) that have been adopting principles that appear supportive of strike activity as a fundamental right, based on the general principles of freedom of association embodied in the ILO Constitution and some other core Conventions such as the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), on the subject matter. Though it does not explicitly mention the right to strike, the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), establishes the right of workers’ and employers’ organizations to ‘organize their administration and activities and to formulate their programmes’ (Article 3), and the aims of such organizations as ‘furthering and defending the interests of workers or of employers’ (Article 10).
 
But it should be borne in mind that neither the ILO Conventions nor the Recommendations have legal force in individual countries (Aborisade, 1992: 76). Member states are only morally obliged to honour by ratifying and implementing Conventions; they are not obliged to implement Recommendations. In other words, while Conventions have binding moral force, Recommendations do not (See Article 19 of ILO Constitution). Therefore, the opinions, recommendations or principles established by ILO Committees would carry less moral force. Even at that, the so-called principles by both the Committee of Experts and the Committee on Freedom of Association tend to be weak. We shall examine the following aspects to corroborate the perceived shortcomings of the ILO principles on the right to strike – principles on essential services, no work no pay, political strikes, and sympathy strikes.
 
Principles on Strikes in Essential Services
The Committee of Experts and the Committee on Freedom of Association appear to justify the scope of restriction of strike action in the ‘essential services’. In 1983, the Committee of Experts defined such services as those ‘the interruption of which would endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population’ (ILO, 1983, para. 214). This definition was adopted by the Committee on Freedom of Association shortly afterwards. Over time, the two supervisory bodies of the ILO have insisted that use of ‘essential services’ in the determination of enterprises where strike action may be prohibited should be applied in the strict sense of the term. However, according to the Committee on Freedom of Association, what is meant by essential services in the strict sense of the term ‘depends to a large extent on the particular circumstances prevailing in a country’ and that ‘a non-essential service may become essential if a strike lasts beyond a certain time or extends beyond a certain scope, thus endangering the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population’ (ILO, 1996a, para. 541). In terms of specific services, the Committee on Freedom of Association has considered to be essential services in the strict sense, where the right to strike may be subject to major restrictions or even prohibitions, to be: the hospital sector; electricity services; water supply services; the telephone service; air traffic control (ILO, 1996a, para. 544). In a general sense, the Committee on Freedom of Association has considered that the following sectors do not constitute essential services, in the strict sense of the term:
 
• radio and television;
• the petroleum sector;
• ports (loading and unloading);
• banking;
• computer services for the
collection of excise duties
and taxes;
• department stores;
• pleasure parks;
• the metal sector;
• the mining sector;
• transport generally;
• refrigeration enterprises;
• hotel services;
• construction;
• automobile manufacturing;
• aircraft repairs;
• agricultural activities;
• the supply and distribution
of foodstuffs;
(ILO, 1996a, para 545)
 
Though the above lists for both categories are not said to be exhaustive, considering the contention that it all depends on concrete circumstances in individual countries. However, when we consider the caveat that definition of essential services can also be influenced by the length and scope of strike action, any of the lists excluded from essential services may become essential.
 
On ‘No-work-no-pay’ principle
The ‘no-work-no-pay’ principle refers to wage deductions for days of strike action. The Committee on Freedom of Association has maintained that this practice gives rise to ‘no objection from the point of view of freedom of
association principles’ (ILO, 1996a, para. 588). Thus, workers and trade unions find no support in the ILO principles in resisting wage deductions during periods of strike actions.
 
On Political Strikes
On the issue of political strikes, the Committee on Freedom of Association considers that ‘strikes of a purely political nature … do not fall within the scope of the principles of freedom of association” (ILO, 1996a, para. 481). In other words, from the standpoint of the Committee, the right to strike does not cover strikes of a purely political nature, although they do cover those which seek a solution to major issues in economic and social policy. Thus, within the framework of this ‘principle’ the popular strikes declared by the labour and trade union movements in support of the annulled  June 12, 1993 election to enable MKO Abiola actualize his mandate and to terminate military dictatorship would be fit for restraint and repression. It is strange that the Committee could come to the above conclusion or principle. After all, Article 10 of the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention No. 87 of 1948 prescribes that workers and employers associations have a right to organize their activities with the aim of ‘furthering and defending the interests of workers or of employers’. Now, interests are not limited to industrial issues alone. In fact, the more fundamental policies which affect the industries and daily lives are products of political decisions.
 
On Sympathy Strikes
Sympathy strikes occur where workers or trade unions declare a strike in support of issues which do not affect
them in a direct and immediate manner. In its General Survey of 1983, the Committee of Experts defined sym-pathy strikes as strikes embarked upon ‘where workers come out in support of another strike. The Committee of Experts maintained that workers should be able to take such action provided that the initial strike they are supporting is itself lawful (ILO (Committee of Experts), 1983, para. 217). In other words, where the initial action (such as an action taken for political reasons) is considered unlawful, the sympathy strike action itself becomes unlawful and it would be permissible, from the standpoint of the Committee of Experts, to restrain such an action.
 
Conclusions
It should be noted that the right to strike was generally considered to be an unlawful activity of a criminal nature, with a few exceptions, until the late nineteenth century, and remained unlawful in many countries beyond the mid-twentieth century. That it has been recognized formally by majority of countries as a fundamental right and by the United Nations, which has so embodied it in the United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, should continue to be supported and strengthened. It is however a big minus that the most relevant UN body, the ILO, has no single Convention or Recommendation upholding the right to strike as a fundamental right. That the right to strike is universally recognized as a fundamental right did not occur on the basis of the free will of employers in both the public and private sectors. It has been on basis of pressure from below, internationally. Therefore, academics, unionists and activists in the social movements have a responsibility to advocate explicit ILO conventions and recommendations upholding the right to strike and a sharpening of the principles established by the ILO supervisory committees, so that the principles clearly, unambiguously and unequivocally defend and advance the right to strike, uncompromisingly and in all ramifications.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References
Aborisade, F. (1992). Nigeria Labour Movement in Perspective. Lagos: The Effective Company.
Davar, R. S. (1976). Personnel Management and Industrial Relations. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House PVT LTD.
Gernigon, B., Odero, A. And Guido, H. (2000).  ILO Principles Concerning the Right to Strike (3rd ed.).  Geneva: ILO.
International Labour Organisation (ILO). (1983). Freedom of association and collective bargaining : General survey by the Committee of Experts on the application of the Conventions on freedom of association, the right to organise and collective bargaining and the Convention and Recommendation concerning rural workers’ organisations. Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations. Report III (Part 4B), International Labour Conference, 69th Session, 1983. Geneva: ILO.
International Labour Organisation (ILO). (1996a). Freedom of association: Digest of decisions and principles of the Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body of the ILO. Fourth (revised) edition. Geneva: ILO.
International Labour Organisation (ILO). (1996b). International Labour Conventions and Recommendations, 1919-1951. Vol. I. Geneva: ILO.
Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1967). Manifesto of the Communist Party. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
Messick, R. E. (1999). ‘Judicial Reform and Economic Development: A Survey of the Issues.’ The World Bank Research Observer, 14:1, pp. 117-136.
Mkandawire, T. (2007). ‘Institutional Monocropping and Monotasking in Africa.’ Paper presented at the Guy Mhone Conference on Public Sector Reforms in Africa organized by CODESRIA in Zomba, Malawi, 22 – 24 August 2007.
Obisi, C. (1996). Industrial Relations. Ibadan: Freeman Productions
Smith, A. (1948). ‘Wealth of Nations’, reproduced in E. Wight Bakke and Clark Kerr (eds). Union, Management and the Public. Harcourt: Brace and World Inc.
Verma, P. (1987). Labour Economics and Industrial Relations. New Delhi: Tata McGraw-Hill Publishing Comoany Limited.
                                           
 
 
 
 
 
 

 

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