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AN ANALYSIS OF THE EXECUTIVE/LEGISLATIVE DIFFERENCES ON BILL TOAMEND THE ELECTORAL ACT


  • The President, by virtue of Section 58(4) of the Constitution has the power to withhold assent to
    bills presented to him. However, by a community reading of sections 58(4) & (5), if the bill is
    again passed by each House of the National Assembly by two thirds majority after the President
    withholds assent, the the bill shall become law and the Presidential assent shall be dispensed
    with. In other words, the President's withholding of assent may be ineffectual, on the long run, if
    the National Assembly is determined to pass the bill into law by following the constitutionally
    prescribed procedure.
    However, it must be observed that there are contradictory provisions which may suggest that the
    Bill seeking to amend the Electoral Act does not violate the Constitution as it is, and there are
    provisions which suggest that the Bill may amount to a violation of the constitutional.
    First, I address the constitutional provisions which suggest that the Bill may be a violation of the
    Constitution.
    It would appear that by Section 119 of the Constitution, the National Assembly lacks the power
    to legislate on the order or sequence of elections. Section 119 of the Constitution sets out the
    scope of the legislative powers of the National Assembly and the scope does not include
    legislating on the sequence or order of elections. The scope is limited to the National Assembly
    legislating on determination of the person who may challenge an election at the election tribunal
    and the grounds of such challenge; circumstances, manner and conditions upon which a person
    may challenge an election at the election tribunal and on the powers, practice and procedure at
    the election tribunal.
    By a community reading of section 119 of the Constitution and Third Schedule, Part 1,
    Paragraph F. 15(a), of the same Constitution, which empowers INEC to organise, undertake and
    supervise elections to the offices of the President, Vice President, Governor, Deputy Governor
    and those of the National Assembly, it would appear that INEC is constitutionally empowered to
    determine the sequence of elections, particularly considering the import of the word "organise".
    Organizing, in my humble opinion, would include determining the sequence or order of events in
    a process.
    As indicated above, there are other constitutional provisions which suggest that the bill to amend
    the Electoral Act may not be a violation of the Constitution.
    The Constitution, in several sections, as well as Section 25(1) of the Electoral Act 2010, both
    expressly empower INEC to determine the dates for elections, not the sequence or order of
    elections. These constitutional provisions include sections 76(1), 116(1), 132(1) and 178(1)
    dealing with elections to the offices of the membership of the National Assembly, House of
    Assembly of a State, President and Governor, respectively. The provisions referred to above
    provide that the INEC shall have the power to set dates of elections in accordance with the
    provisions of the Constitution as well as the Electoral Act. These provisions therefore suggest
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  • that the National Assembly is empowered and expected to legislate on determination of the dates
    of election.
    It would appear that the 2010 amendments of the Constitution have legislatively overruled the
    holdings of the Federal High Court and the Court of Appeal in National Assembly v. President
    (2003) 9 NWLR (Pt. 824) 104 where the Courts held that the National Assembly lacked the
    power to legislate that elections shall hold in one day contrary to the constitutional provisions
    vesting the power to determine election dates in INEC. THIS IS THE JUDICIAL PRINCIPLE
    which the extant Constitution, as amended in 2010, has LEGISLATIVELY NEGATED .
    It would therefore appear that there is, in one breath, lacuna, or, in another breath, contradictions
    and confusion in the Constitution, Considering the above cited provisions on fixing of dates or
    determination of order or sequence of elections.
    On one hand, the Constitution expressly vests the power in INEC to fix election dates. On the
    other hand, the same Constitution provides that the dates shall be in accordance with the
    Electoral Act.
    Within this contradictory context, if the National Assembly provides for order or sequence of
    elections, it cannot be a violation of the Constitution. Indeed, it may be seen a consequential
    amendment to realize the Constitution.
    In the circumstances, only the Courts are in a position to definitively pronounce on the
    constitutionality of the bill to amend the electoral Act. The bill seeks to prescribe the sequence of
    election and not to fix dates of election. From this point of view, it does not violate constitutional
    provisions which empower INEC to fix dates for elections, in accordance with the provisions of
    the Electoral Act.
    But when we assess the Bill from the point of view of Third Schedule, Part 1( F), paragraph 15
    of the same Constitution which empowers INEC to organize elections, generally, the Bill may be
    seen as violating the Constitution.
    We must however observe that what is happening with regard to the differences between the
    legislature and the executive on determination of election dates or sequence of elections is
    competitive struggle to sustain political influence, positions and power of the state actors. In
    other words, what both the legislature and the executive arms of government are demonstrating
    is that they do not care about the wellbeing of ordinary people by dealing with bills that would
    entrench their hold on power. Rather than dealing with bills capable of improving the living
    conditions of ordinary Nigerians, deepening popular participation in the running of the economy
    and society, addressing issues of poverty, unemployment, hunger, collapse of education and
    health care facilities, insecurity, etc, they are concerned only about positions, power and
    influence, in order to advance their economic interests at the expense of ordinary people.
    The media should help portray them for what they are so that the Ruling class does not succeed
    in dictating issues of popular discourse with the aim of diverting attention from issues that
    matter.
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  • Ordinary Nigerians must not queue behind either the legislature or the executive on these issues.
    They are elitist and do not serve to promote either the political or the economic interests of
    ordinary people.
    Let the executive and the legislature promote bills that would facilitate the justiciability of
    chapter 2 of the Constitution and do away with provisions that commercialize the political
    processes.
    Femi Aborisade, Esq

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